In this paper, we explore the link between asset sales end debt capacity. Asset sales are a cormon way far firms to raise saab, and so present an alternative to security issues for firms near financial distress. We argue that liquid assets --those tba c con be resold at attractive terms --are good candidates for debt finance because financial distress for fis with such assets relatively inexpensive. We apply this logic to explain variocion in debt capacity across industries and over the bosiness cycle, as well as to the rise in g.5. corporate leverage in the 1980s.
Introduction.
How do firms choose debt levels, and why do firms or even whole industries sometimes change how much debt they have? Why, for example, have American firms increased their leverage tremendously in the 1980s (Berrianke and Campbell 1988 , Warshassky 1990 , and why has this debt increase been the greatest in some industries, such as food and timber? Despite substantial progress in research on leverage, these questions remain largely open. In this paper, we explore an approach to debt capacity based on the cost of asset sales. We argue that this approach helps understand the crosssectional determinants of leverage, and also sheds light on the debt-increases of the 1980s.
Asset sales are an effective way in which firms can aenerate cash fast, pay off some debt and reduce leverage. A lot of assets are sold by perfeutly healthy firms, which might need cash to acquire other assets or to invest internally, in the 1980s, many companies in very good shape sold divisions. But asset saics are also used by firms in financial trouble to raise cash and avoid default on their debt. As the examples of Texaco, Pan Am and many LBOs illustrate, for highly leveraged firms asset sales are common both in and Out of bankruptcy.
For troubled firms selling assets is an alternative to conventional financial restructuring, such as debt rescheduling, issuing equity to the public or obtaining fresh loans.
Much research has shown that these means of restructuring can be very costly to the firm.
Rescheduling debt creates free rider problems, whereby bondholders hold out for a better deal when they think other bondholders are agreeing to a rescheduling. Geriner and Scharfstein (1990) show that these problems can be severe. Issuing equity has the well known problem of buyer concern that only overvalued firms issue equity. As Myers (1984) shows, this asymmetric information problem substantially raises the costs of equity issue.
In addition, a pubiic equity issue preserves the control of possibly incompetent incumbents, which keeps down the prices investors are willing to pay. Issuing new debt is often no easier than issuing equity, because buyers of new debt are the last in line in claiming the firm's cash flow. The costs of raising new money to pay interest and fund necessary capital etependitures are thus often prohibitive. These costs of financial-restructuring are well understood in the literature.
Asset sales are a form of financial restructuring that is often more attractive than the approaches mentioned above. Such a sale can have two advantages over a public equity issue. First, the buyer of this equity claim can be better informed about its true value than a diffuse set of outside shareholders who buy the public equity issue. This would be particularly important if the buyer-is already in the same industry as the assets being sold. Second, unlike in a public equity sale the buyer gains effective control of the assets, and so can reduce agency costs by for example replacing the manager. These factors suggest that asset sales might be an attractive alternative to the conventional financial restructuring.
In fact, some legal scholars have advocated automatic liquidation of firms in financial distress, on the theory that such liquidation allocates assets to the highest vaiue users and so is cheap and efficient. Financial economists, in contrast, have typically assumed that liquidation is costly, and focused on traditional financial restructuring without spelling out why selling assets is more costly. This paper focuses on the cost of asset 50i05 to gain greater insight into this alternative to conventional financial restructunng. By doing so, we describe this other aspect of the costs of financial distress. Since troobled firms presumably choose the cheapest way of dealing with distress, we hope that this stody will provide torther insight into corporate debt capacity.
T'ne cost of asset sales that we focus on is the lquiditv cost, defined as the difference oet-.een the net present value of an asset's rash fioss in best ose and the price it fetches a quick sale. Some assets, like commodities, are extremely liquid and can be easily sold fast at a price close For most non-fungible and even fungible assets, the highest valuation buyers are those already using similar assets in the same way. In our earlier example, they are the next door farmers. These buyers have two critical advantages over all others. First, they can evaluate the assets most easily and so do not worry as much as others about overpaytng for low quality assets. Second, they know how to manage these assets and so the agency costs that they must incur are the lowest. For these reasons, buyers from the same industry tend to value these assets the most. Moreover, when such buyers compete with each other, they will in many circumstances pay close to the value in best use for the assets. Greenwald et al (1984) , Gertler (1989), Gertler and Hubbard (1988) , Froot and Stein (1991) and others. is that when buyers net worth s low, lenders demand higher returns on the loans they make to control adverse selection dnd moral hazard problems.
With industry or economy.wide shocks, sellers and buyers of assets are in a symmetric situation: they both have a lOW net worth and so both have a very high cost of external conventional financial restructuring costly.
Consider a hypothetical case of an airline (Eastern) that puts its gates, routes, and planes up for sale when it gets into trouble. One possibility is that the adverse shock Eastern has experienced is idiosyncratic; for example it has union problems. In this case, Eastern puts its assets up for sale when other airlines are doing well, and so are not credit constrained, These firms can then bid their true reseriation values for the assets of Eastern and as long as these assets are fungible enough, the auction will bring very attractive prices.
In fact, if other airlines can manage Eastern's assets better than Eastern, they will bid more for them then their value under Eastern's management, and the costs of financial distress will be negative. In this case, asset sales work very well from the viewpoint of Eastern's creditors since not only do these creditors avoid the probletn of illiquidity but they also benefit from the reallocation of assets to higher valued use3. 
